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Abstract
Central banks repeatedly state, that they intend to guide analysts through verbal interven-
tions, in order to minimize short–term fluctuations in exchange rates. We derive analytically an
optimal rule for guidance, given that irrational traders operate in the market. It turns out, that
guidance allows for reconciling the existence of momentum traders with zero serial correlation
in exchange rates, and a positive serial correlation in analysts’ forecast errors can be explained
without requiring herding or under–reaction of analysts. Empirical investigations of the ex-
change rate between assets in the the European Union and the United States reveal that the
demand of currency of momentum traders is positive. The guidance of central banks is found
to be the optimal response.
1 Introduction
Central banks aim at guiding analysts through their press releases, briefings and speeches, so as
to minimize short–term fluctuations in exchange rates.1 For instance, Wim Duisenberg has em-
phasized several times in 2003, that he is seriously concerned about the high short–term volatility
in the Euro/Dollar spot rate, and intends to reduce the swings by using the instrument of verbal
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Woehrmann is visiting the Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University. Financial
support by the National Center of Competence in Research ”Financial Valuation and Risk Management” (NCCR–
FINRISK) is gratefully acknowledged. The national centers in research are managed by the Swiss National Science
Foundation on behalf of the federal authorities. We are grateful to Thorsten Hens, Wolfgang Koehler, Rene´ M. Stulz,
and the participants of the Fifth Doctoral Workshop in Gerzensee for their valuable comments. Furthermore, we
would like to thank Reuters for providing us with data on their quarterly poll regarding banks’ forecasts of economic
variables, and Tan Schelling for preparing the data. Contact: pwoehrma@isb.uzh.ch.
1Recently, Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) provide evidence that the central banks’ ”verbal interventions”
are very effective.
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interventions.2 Further evidence is provided by Edison (1993), Baillie and Osterberg (1997).
We will analyze verbal interventions of central banks by extending the heterogenous agents
model originating in Frankel and Froot (1986), and Day and Huang (1990),3 by introducing analysts
whose expectations are guided by central banks. Optimal control is applied to derive a guidance
rule to minimize the volatility in exchange rates, given that momentum traders operate in the
market. Notice, that the introduction of central bank guidance allows for reconciling the existence
of momentum traders with zero serial correlation in exchange rates.4 Moreover, the guidance
provided by the central banks can produce a positive serial correlation in the forecast error of
analysts.5 Note, that this correlation is usually attributed to underreaction or herding behavior of
analysts.
We conduct an empirical study to assess whether momentum traders are in the market, and
whether the central banks actually have optimally guided the analysts. Therefore, the deep pa-
rameters of the model which comprises the central banks, analysts, and momentum traders in a
random dynamic system, are estimated using the indirect inference approach suggested by Gourier-
oux, Monfort and Renault (1993).
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the foreign exchange rate model
incorporating guidance by the central banks, and provides results concerning its optimality, as
well as an equilibrium when also momentum traders optimize their profits. In section 3 we test
empirically the hypotheses of the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of Central Bank Guidance
It is a common observation that the true fundamental exchange rates, y¯t, t = 1, 2, . . ., and observed
exchange rates, yt, t = 1, 2, . . ., may deviate significantly. We use the heterogenous agent model
originating in Frankel and Froot (1986)or Day and Huang (1990) to explain the main stylized facts
of observed changes in exchange rates, ∆yt, and extend the model by analysts who are guided by
2Notice, that he carefully has distinguished between short–term volatility and the adaption of the exchange rate
to a new fundamental equilibrium.
3For recent studies of this model of the foreign exchange market see Brock and Hommes (1998), Lux and Marchesi
(1999), or De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005).
4There is evidence based on survey that foreign exchange traders base trading decisions on the past exchange rate
movements, see Allen and Taylor (1992), Oberlechner (2001), and Menkhoff (1997). On the other hand, no serial
correlation is found in observed exchange rates.
5For empirical evidence see Zarnowitz (1985) or Schuh (2001).
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press releases and speeches of the central banks. He derives expectations regarding the exchange
rate as follows.
Definition 1 (Expectations of the Guided Analyst).
EGt (∆yt+1) = Gt, (1)
with ∆yt+1 = yt+1 − yt and guidance Gt = γ∆yt, where γ is a parameter reflecting the intensity of
guidance according to recent changes in the value of the currency. The central bank is assumed to
choose γ < 0, in order to reduce volatility in short–term exchange rate movements.
The fundamental analyst is assumed to know the actual fundamental value of the currency y¯t.
His expectations are as follows.
Definition 2 (Expectations of the Fundamental Analyst).
EFt (∆yt+1) = α(y¯t − yt),
where α ≥ 0 is a parameter reflecting the relevance of the fundamentals for the analysts’ expecta-
tions.
Momentum traders are assumed to have a demand for currency depending on recent changes
in the exchange rate, δ∆yt, where δ > 0 is a parameter reflecting the impact of the momentum
traders on the next exchange rate realization.
Applying a widely considered market clearing mechanism in foreign exchange markets, we derive
the dynamical system describing exchange rates.
Definition 3 (Market Clearing). The Walrasian Tattonnement based on overall demand for foreign
cash,
β(EGt (∆yt+1) + E
F
t (∆yt+1)) + δ∆yt, β > 0,
gives a dynamical system for the evolution of the exchange rate through time
∆yt+1 = β(α(y¯t − yt) + γ∆yt) + δ∆yt + εt (2)
with i.i.d. εt ∼ N (0, σε).
Having modelled the dynamics of the exchange rate we are interested in characterizing the
optimality of the central banks’ efforts to minimize short–term fluctuations in the exchange rate
provided that momentum traders are present, yet not optimizing. In Theorem 1 we derive the
optimal guidance γ of the central bank.
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Theorem 1 (Optimal Guidance). Central banks reduce squared forecast errors of the analysts by
choosing the parameter in the guidance rule as γ∗ = − δβ , which solves
min
γ
Et
∞∑
τ=t+1
β¯τ (∆yτ )2
subject to (2), with discount factor β¯.
Proof. It follows straight forward from the optimality conditions for linear–quadratic problems in
Chow (1975), that γ∗ = − δβ .
For the special case of α = 0, i.e. fundamental analysts do not determine the exchange rate,6
and for an optimal choice of guidance, γ = − δβ , we are able to derive realistic implications of the
exchange rate model (2).
Theorem 2 (No Serial Correlation in Changes in Observed Exchange Rates). If α = 0 and
γ = − δβ , then there is no serial correlation in changes in the observed exchange rates, that is,
cov(∆yt,∆yt−1) = 0, although momentum traders may operate in the market, δ > 0.
Proof. For α = 0 and γ = − δβ we have ∆yt+1 = εt. Thus, cov(∆yt,∆yt−1) = 0.
Theorem 3 (Serial Correlation in the Forecast Error). Given the random dynamical system of the
exchange rates (2), and suppose of α = 0 and γ = − δβ , forecast errors always exhibit positive serial
correlation, i.e., E(ztzt+1) > 0.
Proof. The consensus forecast error zt = yt − yˆt = yt−1 = ((β − 1)γ + δ)∆yt−1, where ∆yt =
yt − yt−1, yˆt = EWt (yt+1 − yt) + EFt (yt+1 − yt), and α = 0. Since zt = ∆yt − γ∆yt−1, we can write
E(ztzt+1) = [(β − 1)γ + δ][E(∆y2t ) − γ(cov(∆yt∆yt+1) + E(∆yt)E(∆yt−1))]. If the process driving
the exchange rate changes is stationary, then E(∆yt) = E(∆yt−1) = µ, and for µ = 0 we have
E(ztzt+1) = [(β − 1)γ + δ][var(∆y) − γ(cov(∆yt,∆yt−1)]. Thus, E(ztzt+1) > 0, that is, forecast
errors are positively autocorrelated if γ < −δβ−1 and var(∆yt) > cov(∆yt,∆yt−1). This is true since
we have assumed γ < 0, and cov(∆yt,∆yt−1) = 0 follows from Theorem 3.
3 An Empirical Investigation
In the previous section we have derived a nonlinear random dynamical model for exchange rates
with heterogenous agents including analysts guided by the central bank. We will apply the indirect
6This case is supported in the subsequent empirical analysis.
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inference approach of Gourieroux, Montfort and Renault (1993) to estimate the parameters of
(2), summarized in θ = (α, β, γ, δ), based on the main empirical stylized facts in exchange rates
summarized in the vector ψemp. The vector of stylized facts of simulated exchange rate time series
from the model is denoted by ψ(θ). The deep parameters are then obtained by minimizing the
quadratic distance between observed and replicated moment conditions,
θˆ = argminθQˆ
′(y, y¯, ψ)Wˆ Qˆ(y, y¯, ψ)
with Qˆ(y, y¯, ψ) = ψemp− 1H
∑H
h=1 ψ, where H is the number of simulated exchange rate time series
of T periods, and Wˆ is a positive definite matrix which converges in probability to a deterministic
positive definite matrix W . Due to the central limit theorem θˆ is asymptotically normal,
√
T (θˆ −
θ∗)→d N
(
0,Var(θˆ)
)
. The overidentifying restrictions of the model are tested with the Wald statistic
TH
1 +H
Q′(y, y¯, ψˆ)WˆQ′(y, y¯, ψˆ),
which is asymptotically follows the chi-square distribution with dim(β) − dim(θ)) ≥ 0 degrees of
freedom.
We make use of the following usual stylized facts as moment conditions:
1. Positive autocorrelation in forecast errors ρyt+1−yˆt,t+1 > 0.
2. High volatility in realized and forecast exchange rate deviations, which are σ(yt+1−yt) and
σ(yˆt,t+1−yt), respectively.
3. No autocorrelation in exchange rate deviations ρ∆yt+1 = 0.
4. Excess kurtosis in exchange rate deviations K∆yt+1 > 0.
5. Positive skewness of exchange rate deviations S∆yt+1 > 0.
The data sample for the exchange rate yt is given by the monthly Euro/Dollar reference rate
provided by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, ranging from January 1999 to 2004. Ana-
lysts’ expectations yˆt are proxied by the survey of Reuters, which polls foreign exchange traders
and analysts of about 50 financial institutions in the City of London, North America and Asia.
The survey is taken on the first Monday and Tuesday each month and asks for the forecasts of the
exchange rates one, three, six and twelve months ahead. The data is available from January 1999
to 2004.
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In order to simulate exchange rate time series from (2), we generate H = 1, 000 time series of
T = 1, 500 periods. The starting parameters of the dynamic system are generated randomly. The
true fundamental exchange rate y¯t is assumed to follow a random walk where the variance of the
disturbances is set to the variance of the disturbances of the euro–dollar exchange rate as observed
in the data. We take the spot rate determined by the European Central Bank on January 1, 1999
as starting value for the simulated model. Table 1 provides a summary of the estimation results.
The main finding is, that momentum traders do operate in the market. The central bank uses its
instrument of guidance, and we will investigate its optimality subsequently.
Table 1: Estimation Results for the Deep Parameters.
β α γ δ
Mean 0.2236 0.0251 -0.3624 0.0808
Median 0.1948 0.0148 -0.3943 0.0774
StDev 0.1471 0.0329 0.0819 0.0583
The stylized facts generated by the simulated model are reported in Table 2. Basically, the null
hypothesis that the estimated model matches the empirical stylized facts cannot be rejected.7
Table 2: Estimation Results for the Stylized Facts.
ρyˆt,t+1−yt+1
σ∆yt+1
σyˆt,t+1−yt
ρ∆yt+1 K∆yt+1 S∆yt+1 J(yt, yˆt, β)
Mean 0.2742 2.3384 0.0003 -0.0069 -0.0005 4.8553
Median 0.2753 2.3390 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0004 4.5875
StDev 0.0464 0.0046 0.0072 0.0938 0.0617 0.8416
Data 0.2753 2.3390 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.0000
Wald stat 0.1794
(0.672)
Given that the demand for currency of the momentum traders is positive, we are concerned
about the optimality of the central banks’ efforts to minimize short–term fluctuations in the
Euro/Dollar exchange rate given the estimated parameters of the dynamic system (2). Com-
7It can be seen in Table 1, that the conditions for no serial correlation in changes in observed exchange rates
(Theorem 2), and conditions for serial correlation in the forecast error (Theorem 3) are satisfied.
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paring the solution of the dynamic control problem γ∗ = −0.363, provided in Theorem 1, with the
estimated coefficient γˆ = −0.361, see Table 1, we can conclude that interventions are optimal with
respect to the central banks’ objective function.
4 Conclusion
Based on an empirical assessment of a heterogenous model of exchange rates with central bank
guiding, it is found that momentum traders populate the market for the Euro/Dollar market. We
are able to provide evidence that the the central banks respond with optimal guidance in the sense
of reducing short–term volatility in the exchange rate, yet minimizing the forecast errors of the
analysts.
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